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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

Case No. 960426-CA

v.
ROBERT W. STRINGHAM,

Priority No. 2

Defendant and Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals his convictions for communications fraud, theft, and a pattern
of unlawful activity. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a3(2)(e) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Since defendant has failed to meet his burden of marshaling the
evidence, should this Court decline to consider his insufficiency claim? If the
merits are considered, was the evidence sufficient to convict defendant of
communications fraud, theft, and a pattern of unlawful activity? "When
challenging a jury verdict, a defendant must marshal all the evidence supporting that
verdict and then demonstrate why that evidence is insufficient to support the
conviction." State v. Farrow. 919 P.2d 50, 53 n.l (Utah App. 1996) (citing State v.

Moore. 802 P.2d 732, 739 (Utah App. 1990)). When a defendant fails to meet this
marshaling burden, this Court will decline to consider an insufficiency claim. LL
When a jury verdict is challenged on insufficiency grounds, this Court reviews
the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in
the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury. [This Court will]
reverse a jury conviction for insufficient evidence only when the
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable
that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted.
State v. Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232, 235 (Utah 1992) (citations omitted); gfig also. State v.
BuiL 839 P.2d 880 (Utah App.), cert.denied. 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993).
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it permitted the testimony of
an Internal Revenue Service agent that assigning income is unlawful? The
appropriate standard of review for questions of admissibility of evidence is abuse of
discretion. State v. Garcia. 912 P.2d 997 (Utah App.) (citing State v. Pena. 869 P.2d
932, 938 (Utah 1994)), cert.denied. 919 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1996). In addition, "in
reviewing a trial court's decision to admit evidence, [this Court] will not reverse that
ruling unless a substantial right of the party has been affected." Id* (citing State v.
Qiiyei, 820 P.2d 474, 479 (Utah App. 1991) (citations omitted), cert, denied. 843 P.2d
516 (Utah 1992)).
3. Did the trial court instruct the jury as to the criminal intent required for
communications fraud? Were the trial court's instructions sufficient?

"[This

Court] may review jury instructions or the lack thereof for error in the absence of an
2

objection only 'to avoid a manifest injustice.' Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c)." State v.
Powell. 872 P.2d 1027 (Utah 1994) (citing State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 121-22 (Utah
1989)). "Manifest injustice" is reviewed under the same standard used for deteraiining
plain error under Utah Rule of Evidence 103(d). Verde. 770 P.2d at 121-122. "That
standard is two-pronged. First, the error must be 'obvious.' Second, the error must be
of sufficient magnitude that it affects the substantial rights of a party." LL; £££ alsg
State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5 (Utah App. 1996).
"[The Court] reviewfs] jury instructions in their entirety to determine whether
the instructions, taken as a whole, fairly instruct the jury on the applicable law." Law
v. Blanding Citv. 893 P.2d 1083, 1084 (Utah App.) (citing Ames v. Maas. 846 P.2d
468, 471 (Utah App. 1993)), cert.denied. 910 P.2d 425 (Utah 1995). It will reverse a
conviction "on the basis of an instruction improperly submitted to the jury only where
the party challenging the propriety of the instruction 'demonstrates prejudice stemming
from the instructions viewed in the aggregate.'" LL (quoting State v. Haston. 811 P.2d
929, 931 (Utah App. 1991), rev'd on other grounds. 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993)).
4. Did trial defense counsel's failure to object to the trial court's
instructions constitute deficient performance which prejudiced defendant?
"[W]here the ineffective assistance claim is raised for the first time on direct
appeal, [this Court] must decide whether defendant was deprived of the effective
assistance of counsel as a matter of law. State v. Ellifritz. 835 P.2d 170, 175 (Utah
3

App. 1992)." State v. Tennyson. 850P.2d461 (Utah App. 1993). tt[A]ppellate
review of counsel's performance must be highly deferential; otherwise the 'distorting
effects of hindsight' would produce too great a temptation for courts to second-guess
trial counsel's performance on the basis of an inanimate record." LL (citing Strickland
v. Washington. 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065 (1984)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1801(1) and (7)(1990):
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud
another or to obtain from another money, property, or anything of value
by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or
material omissions, and who communicates directly or indirectly with any
person by any means for the purpose of executing or concealing the
scheme or artifice is guilty of [communications fraud]. . . .
(7) A person may not be convicted under this section unless the
pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions made or
omitted were made or omitted intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless
disregard for the truth.
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404 (1973):
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized
control over the property of another with a purpose to deprive him
thereof.
Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1602(2), (4)(k), and (4)(ppp)(1994):
(2) "Pattern of unlawful activity" means engaging in conduct which
constitutes the commission of at least three episodes of unlawful activity,
which episodes are not isolated, but have the same or similar purposes,
results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are
interrelated by distinguishing characteristics. Taken together, the
episodes shall demonstrate continuing unlawful conduct and be related
either to each other . . . .
(4) "Unlawful activity" means to directly engage in conduct or to
solicit, request, command, encourage, or intentionally aid another person
4

to engage in conduct which would constitute any offense described by the
following crimes or categories of crimes . . . :
(k) theft, Section 76-6-404; . . .
(ppp) communications fraud, Section 76-10-1801;....
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged in an amended information with three counts of
communications fraud, second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-101801 (1990), twelve counts of theft, six of which were second degree felonies, five
third degree felonies, and one a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§§76-6-404 (1973) and 412 (1989), and one count of engaging in a pattern of unlawful
activity, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§76-10-1602 (1994),
(R. 47-49).
Following a jury trial, defendant was found guilty on all counts (R. 347-62;
384). Defendant's motion to arrest judgment (R. 456-66) was denied (R. 1144-1145).
His motion to sentence to the next lower offense on each count (R. 400-409) was
granted (R. 1152). The trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent terms not to
exceed five years in the Utah State Prison on Counts I-IV, a concurrent term of six
months in the Utah County Jail on Count V, and concurrent terms of one year in the
Utah County Jail on Counts VI-XVI (R. 1173-1175). The jail sentences were stayed,
and defendant was placed on probation for 36 months (R. 1175). In addition, defendant
was ordered to serve 45 days in the Utah County Jail and be given credit for "good
5

time," to pay a monthly supervision fee of $30.00 at the discretion of Adult Probation
and Parole, to complete 500 hours of alternative community service witiiin 18 months,
to pay a fine in the amount of $2,000 or complete 400 hours of alternative community
service, and to pay a surcharge in the amount of $1,700 (R. 1178-1180). The trial
court reserved a hearing on restitution contingent on whether a companion civil case
was pursued within 24 months from the date of sentencing (R. 1179).' Defendant
timely appealed (R. 477-78; Utah R. App. P. 4(a)).
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Summary
Communications Fraud (Counts II-IV>. Over a three-year period, defendant
under-reported his income to his pension fund in order to obtain an annual low-income
pension supplement of $4,800.00. Defendant had assigned the additional income to his
wife by having checks compensating him made payable to her sole proprietorship.
Theft (Counts V-XVD. During the 12 monthly pay periods beginning
immediately after he was given responsibility for bookkeeping and payroll, defendant
stole money from the company that employed his wife and himself. Although his
monthly salary was to compensate him for all his services, defendant assigned some of
the hours he worked to his wife, computed them at his wife's hourly rate, and included

1

Through his newly-retained counsel, defendant advised that he did not intend
to pursue the civil case while his criminal appeal was pending (R. 1166-1169).
6

the amounts in checks he prepared made payable to her sole proprietorship. In
addition, after a "trial balloon" of $87.50 the first month, defendant simply included
additional amounts (varying between $800.00 and $1,375.00 each month) in padded
payments to his wife's sole proprietorship for work neither he nor she ever performed.
Pattern of unlawful activity (Count D. These crimes (communications fraud and
theft) constituted a pattern of unlawful activity.
Record Facts
The evidence and all reasonable inferences are recited in a light most favorable
to the verdict. State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah 1993) (case cites omitted).
A. Background: "GS Consulting." Defendant and his wife both had training
and experience as drug and alcohol abuse counselors (R. 402-405, 1216). After they
married, they opened a joint checking account under the name "GS Consulting" (R.
1200; 1216). The initials "GS" stood for "Gail Stringham," the name of defendant's
wife (R. 1215). "GS Consulting" was never registered in the State as a sole
proprietorship or as any other business entity (R. 1200). According to her own
testimony, defendant's wife was "GS Consulting" (R. 1218, 1231), and it had no other
employees (R. 1233-1234; SS£ also. R. 1210). Indeed, for income tax purposes, "GS
Consulting" used her social security number (R. 1232; sfi£ also. R. 1221).
B. Association between UGS Consulting" and Assessment and Psychotherapy
Associates f APA^. In May 1989, APA employed defendant and his wife to open a

7

satellite office in Utah County (R. 858-860, 1191-1192, 1217). APA hired defendant
as a part-time employee to manage the office and to provide limited counseling services
for which he was to be paid a total salary of $400.00 a month (R. 860, 876, 877, 892,
1070, 1100, 1192, 1218). APA hired defendant's wife to provide clinical counseling
services for which she was to be paid $25.00 an hour (R. 893, 1218-1220; State's
Exhibit 5). Both defendant and his wife received paychecks in their own names from
APA (sfi£, e.g., R. 877, 1219; Defendant's Exhibit 11). In addition, although APA
never contracted directly with "GS Consulting" for any services, APA also made
monthly and other supplementary payments to defendant by check made payable to "GS
Consulting" at defendant's request (R. 1236; s££ alsQ R. 1232-1233).
C. Communications fraud: United States Steel and Carnegie Pension Fund fthe
pension fundi Defendant received a regular pension as a former employee of United
States Steel (R. 1073). If he earned less than $5,500 a year, defendant could also
qualify for an annual pension supplement up to $4,800 (R. 1074). If he earned more
than $5,500 a year, defendant could still qualify for a supplement that would be less
than $4,800. M- To qualify for a supplement, the pension fund required defendant to
submit a report each year recording his actual income for the past year, with a copy of
his W-2 or other proof of earnings, and an estimate of his income for the upcoming
year (R. 1075; State's Exhibits 13-15). Defendant omitted a total of $47,225.75 in
annual reports of his income to the pension fund over three years (R. 1081). As a
8

result, he received a total of $13,475.00 in low income pension supplements to which
he was not entitled. Id.
1. Count IT: 1990. Because his APA salary was $400.00 a month, defendant's
W-2 reflected that his annual income for 1990 was $4,800.00 (State's Exhibit 13; sfi£
also Defendant's Exhibit 11, check numbers 2121, 2171, 2196, 4042, 2245, 2262,
4095, 2370, 2460, 2497, 2570, 2658).2 Defendant recorded this amount on the report
of his actual income to the pension fund, and attached a copy of his W-2 (MJ.
The report also required defendant to tt[w]rite in other earned income." In the
blank provided, defendant put "0" (zero), and listed his "Total income" as
"$4,800.00" (LL).
Based on his representations to the pension fund, defendant qualified for the
maximum low income pension supplement of $4,800.00, which the pension fund paid
to defendant for 1990 (1074-1075, 1079; State's Exhibit 13).
However, because APA made additional payments to defendant through "GS
Consulting," defendant's W-2 and his report of income to his pension fund did not
reflect all of his actual 1990 income. By agreement, APA had also paid defendant
$600.00 a month for eight months, and $800.00 for four months as draws against future
revenues defendant was projected to bring to APA through his marketing efforts (R.

2

Aside from the first check, all the checks are for less than $400.00 because of
income tax withholding (R. 1042; see argument under Point I.A.2.(c), below).
9

877-878; SS£ R. 1220; Defendant's Exhibit 11, check numbers 2122, 2172, 2180,
4046, 2268, 2301, 2474, 2501, 2582, 2670). These amounts were paid to "GS
Consulting" at defendant's request, although they were to compensate defendant (R.
877-879). Defendant did not include this amount (a total of $8,000.00, or nearly
double his reported income) in the report of his actual income to the pension fund
(State's Exhibit 13).
In May 1990, APA also paid defendant $912.75 by separate check for additional
money "he felt was owing that month" (R. 879; see Defendant's Exhibit 11, check
number 128). (Defendant contacted the company's controller out of the office to
arrange a meeting so he could be paid this amount. LL) Even though the check was
made payable to defendant, he likewise failed to include this amount in his 1990 report
to the pension fund (State's Exhibit 13; ssSi Defendant's Exhibit 11, check number
128).
In sum, defendant's actual income for 1990 was $13,712.75 (State's Exhibit 1,
addendum A), or nearly $9,000.00 more than he reported to me pension fund; in other
words, defendant's actual income was nearly triple the amount he reported. If
defendant had reported the entire amount, the pension fund would have paid him a
$925.00 supplement instead of the $4,800.00 he received (R. 1079).
2. Count m: 1991. Because defendant reported to the pension fund that his
actual annual income for 1991 was $4,800.00, he qualified for the maximum low
10

income pension supplement of $4,800.00 which the pension fund paid to him for 1991
(1074-1075, 1080; State's Exhibit 14).3 Although APA had paid defendant a salary of
$400.00 a month during 1991 (see. Defendant's Exhibit 11, check numbers 2806, 2865,
2934, 3045, 3096, 3180, 3291, 3357, 3401, 3520, 3569, 3644)/ defendant's report to
the pension fund again omitted the majority of his actual income.
APA had also paid defendant $800.00 for one month, and $900.00 a month for
six more months of 1991, as draws against future revenues (R. 882; State's Exhibit 2,
addendum B; S£g Defense Exhibit 11, check numbers 2670, 2817, 2878, 2948, 3059,
3112, 3197, 3307). These amounts were paid to "GS Consulting" at defendant's
request. LL Defendant did not include this amount ($6,200.00) in the report of his
actual 1991 income to the pension fund (State's Exhibit 14).
In August 1991, APA also paid defendant $5,000.00 as settlement for services
defendant said he had provided, made payable to "GS Consulting" at defendant's
request (R. 883-886, 985-988; 1048-1049; Sfi£ Defense Exhibit 11, check number
3317). Defendant likewise failed to include this amount in the report of his actual
annual income to the pension fund (State's Exhibit 14).
Beginning in August 1991, defendant assumed additional bookkeeping services

3

Defendant's 1991 W-2 is the last page of State's Exhibit 15.

4

Each check is for less than $400.00 because of income tax withholding (R.
1042; see argument under Point I.A.2.(c), below).
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and was put in charge of payroll for which he was paid a $700.00 a month salary made
payable to ttGS Consulting" at his request (R. 885-888; 1100-1101; 1048-1049; 1070).
(In the summer of 1991, defendant told a prospective APA employee that he made
$400.00 a month from APA, but -needed $1,100" and that he put the additional
$700.00 "in GS Consulting" (R. 1070)). Defendant also failed to include this amount
($3,500.00) in the report of his actual annual income to the pension fund (State's
Exhibit 14).
Finally, defendant received an additional $5,100.00 from APA during this period
which he failed to report to the pension fund (sss E.I. Theft- Counts V-IX: APA
payroll. August - December 1991 below: see also R. 1100-1101).
In sum, defendant's actual income for 1991 was $24,600.00 (sjgfi State's Exhibit
2), 5 or nearly $20,000.00 more than he reported to the pension fund. In other words,
defendant's actual income was nearly five times the amount he reported. If defendant
had reported the entire amount, he would not have been eligible for a low income
pension supplement (R. 1080). However, based on the information defendant
provided, the pension fund paid him $4,800.00 for 1991 (R. 1079).

5

The total on State's Exhibit 2 is $1.50 more than the total from the figures on
State's Exhibit 3. There is a $1.00 discrepancy between the totals from State's Exhibit
3 for September and November 1991 and the totals for those months on State's Exhibit
2; and there is a $.50 discrepancy between the total from State's Exhibit 3 for October
1991 and the total for that month on State's Exhibit 2 (State's Exhibits 2 and 3).
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3. Count IV: 1992. The day after APA's controller announced that he was
going to relieve defendant of the responsibility for preparing payroll (namely, on
August 4, 1992), defendant and his wife resigned from APA (R. 914). Because of his
resignation, defendant received his $400.00 APA salary paycheck only through July
1992, and he reported to the pension fund that his annual income for 1992 was $3,200
(State's Exhibit 15; see Defense Exhibit 11, check numbers 3729, 3826, 3900, 3991,
3551, 3606, 3701).6 Based on this reported income, defendant qualified for the
maximum low income pension supplement of $4,800 which the pension fund paid
defendant for 1992 (1074-1075, 1080; State's Exhibit 15).
Again, because APA made additional payments to defendant through "GS
Consulting," his report to the pension fund did not reflect all of his actual income.
APA had also continued to pay defendant $700 a month for bookkeeping and payroll
services. These amounts were paid to "GS Consulting" at defendant's request (R. 89096; 1048-1049; 1070). Defendant did not include this amount (a total of $4,900.00 or, more than his reported income) in the report of his actual income to the pension
fund (State's Exhibit 15).

6

This was an error, since defendant was only paid by APA through July. The
actual amount of defendant's APA salary, paid by check in his name, should have been
$2,800 (State's Exhibit 5).
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Defendant received an additional $9,813.00 from APA during this period which
he failed to report to the pension fund (see E.2. Theft - Counts X-XVT: APA payroll.
January - July 1992 below: see also R. 1100-1101).
Defendant's actual income for 1992 was $17,513.00 (State's Exhibit 5,
addendum C),7 or $14,513.00 more than he reported to the pension fund. Indeed,
defendant's actual income was more than five times the amount he reported. If
defendant had reported the entire amount, he would not have been eligible for a low
income pension supplement (R. 1080). However, based on information defendant
provided, the pension fund paid him $4,800.00 (R. 1080).
D. Theft. After turning over bookkeeping and payroll responsibilities to
defendant in August 1991, the controller would typically sign blank checks for
defendant to fill in later, or simply sign the checks prepared by defendant because he
trusted him (R. 910-913; 1022; 1195-1196; 1235). The controller first became aware
that something was wrong in August 1992 when he took back payroll and check-writing
responsibilities from defendant (R. 913). After computing the July payroll, the
controller noticed that the amount of money payable to defendant and "GS Consulting"
was substantially less than what APA had routinely paid during the previous months (R.
914). (In an October 1993 taped interview with a sheriffs office investigator,

7

This total excludes the $400.00 defendant actually over-reported to the pension
fund for 1992. See n.6, above.
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defendant initially stated that he had a $400.00 salary from APA, but he later indicated
that, as his responsibilities increased, so did his income, and that he was eventually
bringing in about $2,000.00 a month from APA (R. 1100-1101)). A review of billing
sheets and pay documents disclosed why payments to defendant and "GS Consulting"
had been so much higher over the previous months.8
1. Counts V-IX: APA payroll. August - December 1991
a. Double charging. Defendant and APA had agreed that his monthly salary of
$1,100.00 would compensate him for all counseling services he rendered. However,
after assuming control of payroll and bookkeeping in August 1991, defendant began
double-charging for his counseling hours by assigning them to his wife and billing APA
at her hourly rate (R. 890-896; s££ R. 1232-1233).9 These double billings amounted to
an additional $400.00 for August, $350.00 for September, $300.00 for October,
$250.00 for November, and $125.00 for December 1991 (State's Exhibits 3 and 6,

8

When the controller discovered there might be a problem, APA hired an
outside accounting firm to conduct an audit (R. 1213). Information from the audit was
ultimately provided to police investigators. I$L
9

Such an assignment of income was not authorized by defendant's employment
agreement with APA (R. 943; 1048-1049), and was likewise unlawful (R. 1066) and
improper (R. 1210-1212).
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addendum D).10 Payments for assigned hours totaled $1,425.00 for 1991 (see State's
Exhibit 14; paragraph C.2. above).
h. Padded payments. In addition, with control over payroll, defendant simply
began adding varying amounts to monthly compensation checks from APA to a GS
Consulting" for work that neither he nor his wife ever performed, including $87.50 for
August, $800.00 for September, $925.00 for October, $900.00 for November, and
$962.50 for December 1991 (State's Exhibits 3 and 6). These unaccountable amounts
totaled $3,675.00 for 1991 (see State's Exhibit 14; paragraph C.2. above). Although
the controller signed checks for these payments because he trusted defendant and
assumed work had been done, none of these unaccountable payments was authorized by
APA (R. 913, 942-944).
2. Counts X-XVI: APA payroll. January - July 1992
a. Double charging. Defendant continued improperly assigning his counseling
hours to his wife and calculating an amount due based on her hourly rate (R. 890-896;
see R. 1232-1233)." This amounted to an additional $150.00 for January, $75.00 for
10

The December 1991 column for "Assigned Hrs. & Cash" on State's Exhibit 6
apparently contains an error, since 5 hours at his wife's hourly rate of $25.00 would be
$125.00 (as properly noted in the "Assigned Hr. Payment" column for December 1991
on State's Exhibit 3).
" APA billed patients or their insurance companies for counseling services
defendant provided (see., State's Exhibit 22, Billing & Payment Ledger entries dated
6/9/92, 6/15/92, 6/23/92, and 6/30/92). But defendant actually crossed out his name
and inserted his wife's name on ledgers used to calculate payroll (TJL; see R. 910-913,
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February, $125.00 for March, $175.00 for April, $100.00 for May, $325.00 for June,
and $150.00 for July 1992 (State's Exhibits 3 and 6). Payment for assigned hours
totaled $1,100.00 for 1992 (see State's Exhibit 15; paragraph 2.D. above).12
h. Padded payments. Defendant also continued adding varying amounts to
checks from APA to UGS Consulting" for work that neither he nor his wife ever
performed, including $1,125.50 for January, $1,150.00 for February, $1,350.00 for
March, $1,287.50 for April, $1,375.00 for May, $1,300.00 for June, and $1,125.00
for July 1992 (State's Exhibits 3 and 6). These unaccountable amounts totaled
$8,713.00 for 1992 (see State's Exhibit 15; paragraph 2.D. above). Although the
controller signed checks for these payments assuming work had been done, none of
these unaccountable payments was authorized by APA (R. 913, 942-944).
E. Pattern of unlawful activity: communications fraud and theft.
The three episodes of communications fraud were interrelated and had the same
purpose, result, participants, victims, and methods of commission. The twelve
episodes of theft were likewise interrelated. Both demonstrated continuing unlawful
conduct.

938-941; 1231).
12

Again, such an assignment of income was forbidden by defendant's
employment agreement with APA (R. 943; 1048-1049), and was likewise unlawful (R.
1066) and improper (R. 1210-1212).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. Since defendant has failed to meet his burden of marshaling the
evidence, this Court should decline to consider his insufficiency claim. Defendant
excludes any reference to his own admissions about the amount of money he was
actually paid by APA, misrepresents the state of documentation in support of the jury's
verdict, and reargues the evidence most favorable to him, leaving it to this court to sort
out what evidence actually supports the jury's verdict. Therefore, defendant has failed
to meet his marshaling burden and this Court should decline to consider his
insufficiency claim.
Even if the merits are considered, the evidence was sufficient to convict
defendant of communications fraud, theft, and a pattern of unlawful activity.
Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he had the required
mens rea to steal from APA and to defraud the pension fund. Specifically, defendant
essentially asks this Court to rely on his wife's testimony about the terms of his August
12, 1991 agreement with APA in support of his "honest belief" defense, to the
exclusion of the other testimony at his trial.
The jury serves as the exclusive judge of both the credibility of witnesses and the
weight to be given particular evidence. Absent unusual circumstances not present here,
a reviewing court may not reassess credibility or reweigh the evidence, but must
resolve conflicts in the evidence in favor of the jury verdict. By their verdict, the jury
18

obviously rejected the testimony upon which defendant wants this Court to rely.
Therefore, even if the merits are considered, defendant has failed to establish that
"reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt" about his intent to steal
and intent to defraud. The jury's verdict is supported by substantial evidence.
2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted the
testimony of an Internal Revenue Service agent that assigning income is unlawful;
in any event, any error in admitting the testimony was harmless. Defendant argues
that it was an abuse of discretion to permit the IRS agent's testimony that assigning
income is unlawful, arguing that the testimony was a comment on defendant's guilt and
was irrelevant.
These assertions are not only inconsistent, but both are erroneous. The expert's
testimony was not a comment on defendant's guilt, but it was relevant on the issue of
defendant's intent. Even if improperly admitted, the testimony was harmless since
defendant's own CPA testified it would be improper for defendant to assign income,
and defendant's wife testified that defendant actually did assign income to "GS
Consulting" (even though that was not permitted by his agreement). This evidence,
elicited during presentation of defendant's case, made any error in admitting the IRS
agent's opinion testimony harmless.
3. The trial court did instruct the jury on the criminal intent required for
communications fraud, and the instructions were sufficient. Defendant argues that
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the trial court completely failed to instruct the jury on the mens rea required to convict
defendant of communications fraud. Defendant's claim is erroneous. Indeed, the trial
court included instructions on intent and knowledge proposed by defendant. The trial
court's instructions on the mens rea required for a conviction under communications
fraud were sufficient.
4. Trial defense counsel's failure to object to the trial court's instructions
did not constitute deficient performance which prejudiced defendant because the
instructions were proper. Defendant argues that, if the instruction issue under Point
3 was not preserved, it was deficient performance for his trial defense counsel not to
raise it. Defendant's argument can be resolved in the issue of prejudice, since, if the
trial court had failed to give an elements instruction, the issue would have been
preserved. In any event, since the trial court properly gave the required instructions,
trial defense counsel's failure to object was not deficient performance.
ARGUMENT
Point 1
SINCE DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO MEET HIS BURDEN OF
MARSHALING THE EVIDENCE, THIS COURT SHOULD
DECLINE TO CONSIDER HIS INSUFFICIENCY CLAIM;
EVEN IF THE MERITS ARE CONSIDERED, THE EVIDENCE
WAS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT DEFENDANT OF
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, THEFT, AND A PATTERN OF
UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY
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Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions
(Def. Br. at 15). "When challenging a jury verdict, a defendant must marshal all the
evidence supporting that verdict and then demonstrate why that evidence is insufficient
to support the conviction." State v. Farrow. 919 P.2d 50, 53 n.l (Utah App. 1996)
(citing State v. Moore. 802 P.2d 732, 739 (Utah App. 1990)). When a defendant fails
to meet this marshaling burden, this Court will decline to consider an insufficiency
claim. LL Defendant has failed to meet this burden.
A. Failure to marshal. In addition to excluding any reference to his own
admissions about the amount of money he was actually paid by APA (cL Def. Br. at 715; R. 1070, 1100-1101), defendant misrepresents the state of documentation in support
of the jury's verdict, and "merely reargues the evidence most favorable to him, leaving
it to this court to sort out what evidence actually supports the jury's verdict." fifig York
v- Shulsen. 875 P.2d 590, 598 (Utah App.), cjrLdfinied, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994);
S£s also. Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst. 846 P.2d 1282, 1287 (Utah 1993) ("Although
[appellant] cites some evidence that supports the court's findings, even a cursory
review of the record reveals [appellant] frequently omits crucial and incriminating
evidence and cites testimony . . . without reference to conflicting testimony. . . .").
Therefore, defendant has failed to meet his marshaling burden, and this Court should
decline to consider his insufficiency claim. Farrow. 919 P.2d at 53 n.l.
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1. Defendant excluded his admissions. Defendant excluded two admissions
about the amount of money he was actually paid by APA. In his annual report to the
pension fund of his actual income for 1991, defendant represented that his monthly
income from APA was $400.00 (State's Exhibit 14). However, in the summer of
1991, defendant told a prospective APA employee that he made $400.00 a month, but
"needed $1,100" and that he had the additional $700.00 put into "GS Consulting" (R.
1070).
In an October 1993 taped interview with a sheriffs office investigator, defendant
initially stated that he had a $400.00 salary from APA, but he later indicated that, as
his responsibilities increased, so did his income, and that he was eventually bringing in
about $2,000.00 a month from APA (R. 1100-1101).13
Neither of these admissions is included anywhere in defendant's brief, although
both support the jury's verdict and severely undermine defendant's professed "honest
belief" defense. Since he excluded them, defendant has failed to meet his marshaling
burden, and this Court should decline to consider his insufficiency claim. Farrow. 919
P.2dat53n.l.

13

Defendant's estimate was fairly accurate. His actual annual income was
$13,712.75 in 1990, $24,600.00 (see n.5, above) in 1991, and $17,513.00 for the first
seven months in 1992 (State's Exhibits 1-2 and 5), or about $2,000.00 a month for the
last 18 months he was employed by APA.
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2. Misrepresentations. In addition to excluding his admissions, defendant
misrepresents the record on at least three significant points related to the existence or
non-existence of documentation in support of the jury's verdict.
(a.) "Agreements never reduced to writing*. First, in support of his "mass
confusion" argument, defendant asserts that "none of the agreements between the
parties were ever reduced to writing" (Def. Br. at 10; sfi£ also R. 21-22). On the
contrary, the critical August 12, 1991 agreement was reduced to writing; the APA
controller and the administrative assistant who typed the memorandum of the agreement
both testified as to its terms (R. 946, 974, 1021-1022, 1047). The memorandum was
never offered because APA's printed copy, and the floppy disk on which the
memorandum was electronically stored, were stolen with some other business records
during a burglary of APA offices the month after defendant and his wife resigned. Id.
(b.) "No records to back up figures in State's Exhibit 3". Second, defendant
asserts that there are no "records in evidence to back up any of [the] figures" on State's
Exhibit 3 (a one-year summary of payments to defendant and his wife), and that those
figures are only supported by the APA controller's testimony (Def. Br. at 22, 24).
Two multiple-page exhibits rebut this assertion.
State's Exhibit 22 consists of copies of APA "Billing & Payment" ledgers for
June 1992, and copies of checks made out for that month to defendant, his wife, and
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"GS Consulting." These documents support that defendant was assigning his
counseling hours to his wife, as reflected on State's Exhibit 3. 14
In addition, Defendant's Exhibit 11 contains copies of APA checks to defendant,.
his wife, and "GS Consulting" from January 1990 until August 1992. These
documents support the figures in State's Exhibit 3 representing payments to defendant
and his wife (see the analysis under (c.) that follows).15
(c.) "No documentation to support tax withholding". Finally, defendant asserts
that there is "absolutely no documentation to support" the proposition that differences
between the figures in State's Exhibit 3 and the amounts of the checks in Defendant's
Exhibit 11 are attributable to tax withholding (Def. Br. at 25-26). On the contrary,
State's Exhibits 15 and Defendant's Exhibit 25 both support that the differences were
for this reason (see also R. 963, 1027).
State's Exhibit 15 (defendant's W-2 for 1991) shows that a total of $1,063.20
was withheld from defendant's $4,800.00 salary, leaving an after-withholding balance
of $3,736.80. Not coincidentally, that is the precise total amount of APA checks made
payable to defendant in 1991, i.e., $3,736.80 (see Defendant's Exhibit 11, check

14

Seen. 11, above.

15

It should also be noted that, during his testimony, the APA controller had
with him and identified the documents he relied on in preparing State's Exhibit 3;
defendant's trial counsel had these same documents during testimony about the exhibit
(R. 889-891).
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numbers 2806, 2865, 2934, 3045, 3096, 3180, 3291 [all for $354.90], 3357, 3401,
3520, and 3569 [all for $224.40]).l6 State's Exhibit 12 therefore supports that tax
withholding accounts for the difference between the amounts under "Bob's Salary" in
State's Exhibit 3, and the amounts on checks payable to defendant during the same
period in Defendant's Exhibit 11.
Defendant's Exhibit 25 (the 1991 tax return filed jointly by defendant and his
wife) also supports that the APA checks payable to "Gale Stringhamw in 1991 reflected
tax withholding (see Defendant's Exhibit 11). In block 7 of their return, the income
from wages and tips for 1991 is listed as $9,300.00 (Defendant's Exhibit 25).
Subtracting defendant's $4,800.00 W-2 salary from this amount leaves a balance of
$4,500.00 in W-2 salary income which can be attributable to defendant's wife.
Dividing that amount by 12 yields a monthly pre-withholding W-2 salary of $375.00. l7
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Although checks for January 1991 are missing from the defendant's exhibit,
the APA controller testified that defendant was paid a direct salary of $400.00 (before
taxes) that month (R. 882). Assuming defendant's withholding was the same as it was
for the previous 5 months (see Defendant's Exhibit 11, check numbers 2658, 2570,
2497, 2460, and 2370 [all for $354.90]) and the following 7 months (see Defendant's
Exhibit 11, check numbers 2806, 2865, 2934, 3045, 3096, 3180, 3291 [all for
$354.90]), a jury could reasonably infer that defendant received a check, after
withholding, of $354.90 in January 1991.
17

This same amount can be arrived at in a different way. APA paid defendant's
wife for most of her clinical services through ttGS Consulting'' (R. 904, 963). But so
that APA could carry her on its malpractice policy for a minimal annual premium, she
was paid separately for some of her hours in checks payable in her own name (R. 904,
963, 1219-1220). Based on the face amounts of these checks during 1991 (see
Defendant's Exhibit 11, check numbers 2810, 2869, 2938, 3049, 3100, 3184, and 3295
25

The discrepancies defendant claims exist between State's Exhibit 3 and the
checks in Defendant's Exhibit 11 (Def. Br. at 25-30) vanish when this pre-withholding
W-2 salary amount ($375.00) and defendant's pre-withholding W-2 salary amount
($400.00) are taken into account.18

[all for $319.13], 3360, 3405, 3524, and 3573 [all for $210.38]), and her hourly rate of
$25.00 an hour (R. 1219-1220), a jury could reasonably infer that tax was withheld
(see R. 1027). Given the figures in State's Exhibit 3 and Defendant's Exhibits 11 and
25, and allowing for tax withholding, a jury could reasonably infer that these monthly
checks paid defendant's wife for 15 hours (at $25.00 an hour), and that the prewithholding amount of her monthly W-2 salary check from APA was $375.00.
18

For example, for August 1991, adding defendant's pre-withholding W-2
salary of $400.00 to his wife's pre-withholding W-2 salary of $375.00 and to that
month's "GS Consulting" payment of $2,800.00 (Defendant's Exhibit 11, check
number 3369), yields a total of $3,575.00, which is the total listed under "Actual
Payment" for that month on State's Exhibit 3. Further, taking into account the $375.00
pre-withholding payment to defendant's wife helps explain the amount of the "GS
Consulting" payment for August 1991 (Defendant's Exhibit 11, check number 3369).
The payment to "GS Consulting" can be broken down as follows: it includes
defendant's $700.00 bookkeeping salary (under "Bob's Fin. Salary," State's Exhibit 3;
see R. 885-888, 892, 1048-1049, 1070, 1100-1101), the $400.00 for his counseling
hours that defendant improperly assigned to his wife (under "Assigned Hr. Payment,"
State's Exhibit 3; see R. 890-896, 1232-1233), the $1,987.50 for Gale's undisputed
hours (under "Gale's Payment", State's Exhibit 3; see R. 893), and the $87.50
improper "padded payment" (under "Unaccounted," State's Exhibit 3; R. 894). Added
together, these figures total $3,175.00. When the $375.00 paid to Gale separately (see
Defendant's Exhibit 11, check number 3360; R. 893, 963) is subtracted, it leaves a
total of $2,800.00. APA's check to "GS Consulting" for August 1991 was for
precisely that amount (Defendant's Exhibit 11, check number 3369).
The same kind of computation works for each of the other months listed on
State's Exhibit 3: adding the pre-withholding W-2 salaries of defendant and his wife (a
total of $775.00) to the amount paid by check to "GS Consulting" (see Defendant's
Exhibit 11) yields the amount of the "Actual Payment" listed on State's Exhibit 3.
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In summary, State's Exhibit 15 and Defendant's Exhibit 25 support that tax
withholding accounts for differences between amounts in State's Exhibit 3 and
Defendant's Exhibit 11. Like his factual assertion to the contrary, defendant's
conclusory assertion that there are inexplicable discrepancies between the exhibits is
erroneous. Together with exclusion of his own admissions, defendant's
misrepresentations about documentation in support of the jury's verdict establishes that
he has failed to meet his marshaling burden. Since he has failed to meet his burden,
this Court should decline to consider his insufficiency claim. Farrow. 919 P.2d at 53
n.l.
3. Marshaling v. rearguing favorable evidence. In West Valley City v. Majestic
Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991), this Court wrote:
In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every
scrap o? c ^mpetent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very
findings Lie appellant resists.
(Emphasis in original). Instead of marshaling the evidence in support of the jury's
verdict, defendant "merely reargues the evidence most favorable to him, leaving it to
this court to sort out what evidence actually supports the jury's verdict." York. 875
P.2d at 598; see Def. Br. at 7-37. "Although [defendant] cites some evidence that
supports the court's findings, even a cursory review of the record reveals [defendant]
frequently omits crucial and mcriminating evidence and cites testimony . . . without
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reference to conflicting testimony . . . ." Sfifi Alms Indus. Ltd.. 846 P.2d at 1287.
In summary, because defendant excluded his admissions, misrepresented the
status of documentation in support of the jury's verdict, and simply reargued favorable
evidence instead of marshaling the evidence in support of the jury's verdict, this Court
should decline to consider his insufficiency claim. Farrow. 919 P.2d at 53 n.l.
B. Sufficient Evidence. Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to
establish his guilt for communications fraud since it failed to establish that he had a
scheme or artifice to defraud, and that he made representations or omissions
intentionally or knowingly (Def. Br. at 32-33). Defendant further argues that his
"honest belief that what he was doing was proper" should have served as a complete
defense (Def. Br. at 34).
In addition, defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish his
guilt for theft since it fails to establish that he had the intent to steal (Def. Br. at 21).
Defendant further asserts that "much of the evidence presented supported the
proposition that [he] honestly believed he was paying himself and GS Consulting the
proper amount due to them" (I$L).
Assuming, arguendo, this Court decides consider the merits of defendant's
insufficiency claim, he has failed to establish that, viewed in the light most favorable to
the jury's verdict, the evidence and all reasonably inferences which may be drawn from
it are so sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must
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have entertained a reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt. Sfig Hamilton. 827 P.2d at
235.
1. August 12. 1991 agreement. The terms of defendant's August 12, 1991
agreement with APA are critical to his arguments about counts HI through XVI (two of
the communications fraud counts, and the twelve theft counts). Defendant essentially
asks this Court to rely on his wife's testimony about the terms of this agreement to the
exclusion of the other testimony at his trial. In other words, defendant is asking this
Court to reject the jury's conclusions about witness credibility. The Utah Supreme
Court has written:
When the evidence presented is conflicting or disputed, the jury serves as
the exclusive judge of both the credibility of witnesses and the weight to
be given particular evidence. State v. Myers. 606 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah
1980); State v. Gentry. 747 P.2d 1032, 1039 (Utah 1987); State v.
Logan, 563 P.2d 811, 813 (Utah 1977); State v. Harless. 23 Utah 2d 128,
459 P.2d 210, 211 (Utah 1969). Ordinarily, a reviewing court may not
reassess credibility or reweigh the evidence, but must resolve conflicts in
the evidence in favor of the jury verdict. Logan, 563 P.2d at 813-14.
State v. Workman. 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993). The supreme court concluded that
in "some unusual circumstances" a reviewing court may reassess witness credibility,
such as where there is "either a physical impossibility of the evidence being true, or its
falsity must be apparent, without any resort to inferences or deductions." LL (citing
Curtis v. DeAtlev. 663 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Idaho 1983) (quoting Dinneen v. Finch. 100
Idaho 620, 603 P.2d 575, 582 (Idaho 1979)); see also Siruta v. Hesston Corp.. 232
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Kan. 654, 659 P.2d 799, 806 (Kan. 1983) (evidence may be disregarded when it is
"clearly contrary to some immutable law of physics or is hopelessly in conflict with one
or more established and uncontroverted physical facts")). Since such unusual
circumstances do not exist in this case, the jury's credibility determinations should not
be disturbed.
Aside from the self-serving testimony of defendant's wife, testimony about the
terms of defendant's August 12, 1991 agreement with APA is consistent and
corroborated even by defendant's own admissions. Those terms were simply that APA
would continue to pay defendant $400.00 a month for administrative duties and
counseling, and begin paying defendant $700.00 a month for bookkeeping and financial
duties, and that APA would no longer pay draws on future revenues to defendant (R.
885-888, 973, 1048-1049).
Defendant's wife's contrary testimony was weak. She did not attend the meeting
in which the agreement was reached, and could not even remember who told her the
purported terms of the agreement (R. 1233). Furthermore, her testimony that it was
not agreed that defendant would be paid a flat salary of $1,100.00 a month (R. 1233)
contradicts the other witnesses to the agreement (R. 885-888, 973, 1048-1049) and
defendant's own 1991 admission that APA was, in fact, paying him $1,100.00 a month
(R. 1070). Likewise, her testimony about payments to "GS Consulting" for continued
draws on future revenues and $1,000.00 a month for bookkeeping (R. 1220, 1223) is
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contradicted, not only by the other witnesses to the agreement (R. 885-888, 973, 10481049), but by defendant's admission that he, not *GS Consulting," was eventually
making about $2,000.00 a month from APA (R. 1100-1101). Finally, defendant's
admission that APA was paying him $700.00 a month, in addition to his $400.00
salary, corroborates the testimony that APA paid him $700.00 a month for bookkeeping
(R. 885-888, 973, 1048-1049), as it contradicts his wife's testimony that APA paid
"GS Consulting" $1,100.00 a month for bookkeeping. By their verdict, it is clear the
jury rejected the testimony of defendant's wife about his agreement. This credibility
determination should not be disturbed on appeal. Sfi£ Workman. 852 P.2d at 984.
In summary, defendant's reliance on his wife's testimony to establish the
purported terms of his employment agreement is misplaced since her testimony was
obviously disbelieved by the jury, and reviewing courts are required to defer to a jury's
credibility determinations. Defendant's reliance is, in any event, misplaced since she
was not a party to the agreement and could not remember who told her of its purported
terms, and since her testimony is contradicted by other testimony and defendant's
omitted admissions.

2. Communications fraud.
a. Scheme or artifice to defraud. Defendant argues that the evidence at trial is
insufficient to establish that defendant had "a scheme or artifice to defraud" (Def. Br.
at 33). Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1801(1) (1990) states:
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(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud
another or to obtain from another money, property, or anything of value
by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or
material omissions, and who communicates directly or indirectly with any
person by any means for the purpose of executing or concealing the
scheme or artifice is guilty of [communications fraud]. . . .
The evidence establishes that "GS Consulting," the name on the joint checking account
defendant opened with his wife, was part of the "scheme or artifice" defendant devised
and used to defraud the pension fund, and that the annual report of income he signed,
and his attached W-2 form, were the means he used to communicate the
misrepresentation that concealed his actual income (State's Exhibits 13-15).
As noted, defendant asked APA to pay compensation in addition to his $400.00
monthly salary to "GS Consulting" (R. 877-879, 882, 883-888, 985-988, 1048-1049).
Defendant admitted as much (R. 1070), and his wife's testimony corroborated his
admission (R. 1232-1233). Since these payments were not reported on his W-2 or by
defendant himself as "other earned income" in the space provided on his annual
reports, a jury could reasonably infer that defendant's surreptitious diversion of income
to "GS Consulting" was the scheme or artifice defendant used to hide his actual income
from the pension fund.
b. Knowing and intentional omissions. Defendant argues that the evidence was
insufficient to establish that he made "any representations or omissions intentionally or
knowingly" (Def. Br. at 17). Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1801(7) (1990) states:
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(7) A person may not be convicted under this section unless the
pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions made or
omitted were made or omitted intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless
disregard for the truth.
Defendant's admissions about his income from APA establish that his representations
and omissions in his reports to the pension fund were both knowing and intentional.
In 1991 defendant told a prospective APA employee that he made $400.00 a
month, but "needed $1,100" and that he had the additional $700.00 put into "GS
Consulting" (R. 1070). From this admission, a jury could reasonably infer that
defendant knowingly received more than $400.00 a month, that he intentionally had
extra income paid into a GS Consulting," and that his omission of income in his 1991
report to the pension fund was knowingly false.
In an October 1993 taped interview with a sheriffs office investigator, defendant
initially stated that he had a $400.00 salary from APA, but he later indicated that, as
his responsibilities increased, so did his income, and that he was eventually bringing in
about $2,000.00 a month from APA (R. 1100-1101). Yet he reported to the pension
fund that he was receiving only $400.00 a month. Based on this evidence, a jury could
reasonably infer that defendant knowingly and intentionally under-reported his income
to the pension fund.
c. No honest belief. In short, defendant's admissions establish that his failure to
disclose these substantial amounts to his pension fund was knowing and intentional and
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that he could not and did not have an "honest belief" that the amounts he reported were
correct. Defendant has failed to establish that, viewed in the light most favorable to the
jury's verdict, the evidence and reasonable inferences are so sufficiently inconclusive or
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt
that defendant's guilt. Sfifi Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 235.
3. Theft
a. Intent to steal. Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to show
he had the intent to steal from APA (Def. Br. at 21). Defendant asserts that because
there was "mass confusion" (Def. Br. at 22, 31) as to his agreement with the company,
he "held an honest belief that he was writing checks to himself, his wife and GS
Consulting in the amounts agreed upon" (Def. Br. at 31). Defendant cites his wife's
second-hand and discredited testimony about the agreement as evidence of the "mass
confusion" and his "honest belief."
As noted (see L., above), the credible testimony established that on August 12,
1991, APA agreed to continue to pay defendant $400.00 a month for administrative
duties and counseling, and to begin paying defendant $700.00 a month for bookkeeping
and financial duties. APA and defendant also agreed on that date that APA would no
longer pay draws on future revenues to defendant (R. 885-888, 973, 1048-1049).
Following this agreement, defendant manifested his intent to steal because the amounts
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he made payable to ttGS Consulting" exceeded the amounts authorized under the terms
of this agreement.
(VS Double charging. Immediately after he was put in control of payroll,
defendant manifested his intent to steal by assigning counseling hours he had worked to
his wife in violation of his agreement with APA. Payments for the assigned hours
while defendant was in control of payroll totaled $2,525.00 (R. 892-905; State's
Exhibit 3).
APA never agreed to pay defendant by the hour for counseling services he
provided, and never authorized defendant to assign his hours for payroll purposes (R.
876-877, 942-943, 1048-1049, 1218-1220). Defendant agreed that his $400.00 salary
was to cover any counseling he provided (R. 876-878, 885-888). Defendant's wife
nevertheless conceded on cross-examination that APA did pay "GS Consulting" for
hours of clinical counseling defendant provided (R. 1233).19
Documentary evidence corroborates this concession. Payroll ledgers show
19

Defendant's wife testified that mere were discrepancies between the number
of hours her records showed she had worked and what APA's payment and billing
ledgers reflected for the period between August 1991 and August 1992 (R. 1222-1228;
Defendant's Exhibit 27). She also testified that APA actually owed her more money
(R. 1221-1222). This claim is a remarkable "red herring" since she testified that she
and defendant did APA's bookkeeping together during this period (R. 1220), the parties
stipulated that defendant wrote the bulk of all APA checks during this period (R. 1022),
and there was no dispute about past payments for her hours when, following their
resignations, defendant submitted aGS Consulting's" final accounting to APA (R.
1221-1222; Defendant's Exhibit 20).
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defendant's name crossed out as the therapist and his wife's name written in (see., £,&.,
State's Exhibit 22, Billing & Payment Ledger entries dated 6/9/92, 6/15/92, 6/23/92,
and 6/30/92; SSSL R. 910-913, 938-941). The parties stipulated that these changes were
in defendant's handwriting (R. 1231). As a result of these changes, defendant was paid
twice for his services: once by his regular salary, and again by attributing his work to
his wife and billing APA at her hourly rate (R. 885-888, 973, 1048-1049). Such a
double payment was not authorized by defendant's agreement with APA (R. 942-943;
1048-1049).
Because defendant assigned his counseling hours to his wife so that he could be
paid twice, in violation of his agreement with APA, a jury could reasonably infer that
defendant had the intent to steal. Defendant has failed to establish that, viewed in the
light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the evidence and reasonable inferences are so
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that he had the intent to steal. Hamilton. 827 P.2d at 235.
(2) Padded payments. With control over payroll, defendant immediately began
making monthly padded payments to "GS Consulting." Since these payments were in
addition even to the hours defendant assigned to his wife and are not supported by any
agreement between the parties, they likewise manifest defendant's intent to steal.
After accounting for defendant's $700.00 "bookkeeping'' salary, payment for the
counseling hours he was improperly assigning to his wife, and payment for his wife's
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undisputed hours, the unaccountable padded payments for the 12 months defendant was
in control of payroll totaled $12,387.50 (R. 892-905; State's Exhibit 3).
Defendant's wife's testimony suggested that these amounts could be explained by
discrepancies in the payments for her hours, draws on future revenue, or profit-sharing.
It is clear by their verdict that the jury rejected these explanations and found that the
testimony of defendant's wife was not credible. This credibility determination should
not be disturbed on appeal. Sfifi Workman. 852 P.2d at 984.
As described in n.19 above, discrepancies in his wife's hours are a "red herring"
since defendant himself was in charge of bookkeeping and payroll during this period,
and made out the payroll checks. Indeed, defendant's wife does not account for the
padded payments by claiming that APA mistakenly overpaid her — she has insinuated
instead that APA somehow underpaid her (R. 1221-1228).
Neither can draws on future revenues explain the unaccountable amounts.
Defendant's wife was alone in testifying that a $600.00 draw on future revenues
continued through this period (R. 1220, 1223). However, the credible evidence is that
all draws on future revenues ceased as of August 1991 (R. 885-888, 973, 1048-1049).
Further, testimony that the draws had increased to $800.00 and then $900.00 before
they ceased in August is supported by the checks themselves (R. 877-878; see. R. 1220;
Defendant's Exhibit 11, check numbers 2122, 2172, 2180, 4046, 2268, 2301, 2474,
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2501, 2582, 2670). In any event, none of the unaccountable amounts after August
equals $600.00 (State's Exhibit 3). In fact, all but the first actually exceed it. LL
Finally, profit-sharing cannot explain the unaccountable amounts. Defendant's
wife was also alone in testifying that APA and ttGS Consulting" had a profit-sharing
agreement during this period (R. 1219; but see R. 1192). However, based on her
testimony and tax returns, "GS Consulting" had no profit (R. 1234; Defendant's
Exhibits 24-26). But even if it had, this could not account for the defendant's padded
payments since his final accounting to APA, dated September 1, 1992, claims that a
share of profits due to "GS Consulting" from January 1, 1991 until August 31, 1992
had not yet been paid (Defendant's Exhibit 20).
In summary, because the padded payment amounts cannot be attributed to his
wife's hours, draws on future revenue, or profit-sharing, a jury could reasonably infer
that defendant had the intent to steal. Defendant has failed to establish that, viewed in
the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the evidence and reasonable inferences
are so sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must
have entertained a reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt. Sfifi Hamilton. 827 P.2d at
235.
h. No honest belief. Because defendant chose not to testify, there was no direct
evidence before the jury that defendant believed his acts were innocent. Moreover,
because his wife did not testify as to terms defendant told her he believed were part of
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his agreement, there is not even second-hand evidence as to his belief. Nevertheless,
the trial court gave the "honest belief' defense instruction to the jury (R. 319,
Instruction No. 25). By its verdict, the jury demonstrated that it rejected this defense.
Based on the evidence before it, the jury acted reasonably. Defendant has failed to
establish that, viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the evidence is so
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt. Sfifi Hamilton. 827 P.2d at 235.
Point 2
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN
IT PERMITTED THE TESTIMONY OF AN INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE AGENT THAT ASSIGNING INCOME IS UNLAWFUL;
IN ANY EVENT, ANY ERROR IN ADMISSION OF THIS
TESTIMONY WAS HARMLESS
Defendant argues that it was an abuse of discretion to permit an IRS agent, who
was qualified as an expert, to testify that assigning income is unlawful, because the
testmony went directly to the expert's opinion as to defendant's guilt, and because the
testimony was irrelevant (Def. Br. at 37-41). These assertions are not only
inconsistent, but both are erroneous. The expert's testimony was not a comment on
defendant's guilt, but it was relevant on the issue of defendant's intent. Even
assuming, arguendo, that it was improper to admit this testimony, any error was
harmless.
The challenged testimony follows:
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Q
I'm going to pose a hypothetical. If an individual - we'll call him
Mr. A [-] performs personal services, such as accounting work, tax
preparation, payroll preparation, filing of quarterly tax returns,
preparation of tax documents for employers, a compilation of payroll
records, and clinical works [sic] such as counseling, group therapyf,]
individual counseling, is it lawful for that individual to assign income
from those activities to a third party[?].
• ••

A

No, that is not lawful.

(R. 1066).
A. Not a comment on guilt. On its face, this testimony cannot be construed as
expressing an opinion about defendant's guilt as to the charged offenses. Whether
assigning income is unlawful was not even an issue to be decided by the jury in
defendant's case (see R. 335, 332, 331, 337-338). As trial defense counsel pointed out
in challenging the testimony, "We are not here over a tax law" (R. 1057). The charged
offenses were violations of Utah communications fraud, theft, and racketeering statutes
(see Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1801(1990), §76-6-404 and 412 (1989), and §76-6-1602
(1994)). The IRS agent's testimony related specifically to federal tax law, and he cited
a federal statute as the basis for his opinion ("26 U.S.C."- R. 1068).20
This Court has written, "'it [is] clear that questions which would merely allow
the witness to tell the jury what result to reach are not permitted. Nor is the rule [Rule
704] intended to allow a witness to give legal conclusions.'" State v. Tenney. 913 P.2d
20

Although federal tax law was implicated because defendant was required to
file his W-2 in support of his annual report of actual income to the pension fund (see
State's Exhibits 13-15), defendant was not being prosecuted for federal tax fraud.
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750, 756 (Utah App.) (quoting Davidson v. Prince. 813 P.2d 1225, 1231 (Utah App.)
(quoting Owen v. Kerr-McGee Corp.. 698 F.2d 236, 240 (5th Cir. 1983)), cert.denied.
826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991)), cert.denied. 923 P.2d 693 (Utah 1996); accoid State v.
LaiSfin, 828 P.2d 487, 493 (Utah App.), afCd, 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993). Quoting
Davidson, however, the Court in Tenney noted that "'there is no bright line between
permissible questions under Rule 704 and those that call for overbroad legal
responses. '" I$L The Court specifically concluded that the expert testimony in question
in Tenney provided "an impermissible legal conclusion" because it was tied to the
requirements of Utah law. LL
In defendant's case, the expert's opinion related to federal tax law, not Utah law
(R. 1068). Defendant's case is similar to State v. Harry. 873 P.2d 1149 (Utah App.
1994). In that case, Harry objected to the expert's testimony that a certain securities
transaction was "illegal." Id,, at 1154 n.9. Harry complained that this testimony was
inadmissible "because it expressed a legal conclusion on a point that was not even an
element of me crime" of which he was charged, and that "the information prejudiced
the jury against him." LL In rejecting Harry's argument, this Court concluded that
the expert never testified that Harry actually [engaged in the illegal
transaction]. That factual determination was left to the jury. Moreover,
the fact that [the questioned transaction] is prohibited is relevant to
Harry's state of mind and the willfulness of his actions. We therefore see
no error on the part of the trial court on this point.
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Id. Thus, as opposed to the expert in lejmsy., the expert witness in Hany did not
express an impermissible legal conclusion.
This conclusion in Harry should be dispositive in defendant's case. Although, as
a practical matter, to convict defendant, the jury had to make the factual finding that he
assigned his income to deceive the pension fund as to his actual income, the jury was
not required to find that assigning income was unlawful (see R. 335, Instruction No.
10). Indeed, they could have concluded that assigning income was not unlawful and
still found defendant guilty. IsL Further, the IRS agent did not testify on the factual
issue as to whether, in his opinion, defendant had actually assigned his income. He
testified based on a hypothetical. See Utah R. Evid. 703, 704(a). The jury was still
required to make its own factual determinations. Sss. Harry. 873 P.2d at 1154 n.9.
The agent's testimony did not "simply tell the jury what [factual or legal] result to
reach." Davidson v. Prince. 813 P.2d 1225, 1231 (Utah App. 1991). Therefore,
because it did not relate directly to a conclusion to be made by the jury, the IRS agent's
opinion about the lawfulness of assigning income could not be construed either as an
impermissible legal opinion or as an opinion as to defendant's guilt.21

21

Defendant has made no suggestion that the IRS agent's testimony was unfairly
prejudicial because its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice or confusion of the issues. See Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(1) and 403.
Since he failed to assert a claim of prejudice at the trial court (R. 1055-1068), this issue
is not properly preserved for appeal. State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355, 1363 n.12 (Utah
1993).
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B. Relevant on intent. After mistakenly complaining that the testimony
commented on defendant's guilt, defendant makes the inconsistent claim that the agent's
testimony should have been excluded as irrelevant (Def. Br. at 39-41). "Relevant
evidence" means "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that
is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence." Utah R. Evid. 401.
Here, defendant created an elaborate scheme to disguise the nature of his income
and even to obtain and conceal income he had never earned. His defense was that he
had acted in the honest belief that the scheme was innocent (see Def. Br. at 19-40).
Hence, evidence that assigning income (one element of defendant's scheme) was
unlawful had a tendency to make his intent to commit the charged crimes more
probable, and his "honest belief" defense less probable (see R. 318, Instruction No.
26). Indeed, defendant argues that his "defense . . . was not contradicted by any other
witness than" the agent (Def. Br. at 39). Therefore, the agent's testimony was
relevant. Sfi£ alSQ Harry. 873 P.2d at 1154 n.9 (expert testimony that a questioned
transaction is illegal was relevant to the defendant's state of mind and the willfulness of
his actions).
C. Harmless error. Even if the IRS agent's testimony were improperly
admitted, defendant has failed to provide any legal analysis or precedent regarding his
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claim of prejudice. Indeed, the agent's testimony cannot have been prejudicial since
defendant's own witness testified to the same effect.
Defendant makes only two assertions regarding prejudice. He argues that, since
his defense was only contradicted by the agent's testimony, "it is clear the testimony
had a prejudicial affect [sic] on the outcome of this matter" (Def. Br. at 39). He also
asserts, "Allowing [the agent] to testify as an expert witness in this matter was clear
error and resulted in extreme prejudice to the defendant and an unfair trial''(Def. Br. at
40-41). Aside from these brief, conclusory statements, defendant has completely failed
to provide any legal analysis or precedent regarding his claim of prejudice. Sfi£
Tenney. 913 P.2d at 756 (even where error obvious, no prejudice where defendant
failed to demonstrate prejudice). For this reason alone, his claim fails. LL
In addition, Mr. Ronald Harrington, defendant's own CPA, testified without
objection that assigning income was improper:
Q. . . . If [defendant] had a contract to perform services for a third
party, APA, to do bookkeeping, payroll, file quarterlies, do the tax work,
maintain the books, administer the offices, do counseling, and he received
$1,100 for that, would he be eligible to put any portion of his $1,100 into
Gale Stringham's name?
A. No
Q. Then he could not assign his income to her 1099?
A. No. . . .
Q. Using that exact same analogy, if someone agreed to pay you $1,100
a month to do books, to do that sort of thing, could you then show it as
income to your wife?
A. No, and not be correct.
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Q. And if your wife had a sole proprietorship, if she was also doing
business, if she had also taken that name, used that name as well, would it
be proper for you to pay that money to her sole proprietorship as income?
A. Money that I earned myself?
Q. That you earned.
A. No.
(R. 1210-1212). Indeed, Mr. Harrington actually testified that assigning income
would be "tax fraud'' if intent to defraud were shown (R. 1212).
Further, although defense counsel claimed that defendant had acted in reliance
on Mr. Harrington's advice (R. 1108; sfi£ R. 318, Instruction No. 26), Mr. Harrington
testified that defendant had not asked for his advice on the subject until nearly nine
months after the date of defendant's last charged offense (R. 1211). This testimony,
elicited during presentation of defendant's case, made any error in admitting the IRS
agent's testimony harmless.
Finally, defendant's assignment of his APA income was not authorized by APA
(R. 876-877, 885-888, 942-943, 1048-1049, 1218-1220). However, defendant's wife
nevertheless conceded on cross-examination that APA did pay "GS Consulting" for
work defendant performed (R. 1232-1233). This evidence that, contrary to his
agreement with APA, defendant actually did assign his income to "GS Consulting"
made any error in admitting the IRS agent's opinion in response to a hypothetical
question harmless. Sfi£ State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355, 1363 (Utah 1993) (trial court's
proper instructions made any error in admitting expert testimony harmless).

45

Point 3
THE TRIAL COURT DID INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE
CRIMINAL INTENT REQUIRED FOR COMMUNICATIONS
FRAUD, AND THE INSTRUCTIONS WERE SUFFICIENT
Defendant argues that the trial court completely failed to instruct the jury on the
mens rea required to convict defendant of communications fraud (Def. Br. at 41-45).
Defendant's claim is erroneous (see R. 335, Instruction No. 10; see also instructions on
intent, R. 321-326, Instruction Nos. 18-23; the "honest belief defense, R. 319,
Instruction No. 25; and the "mistake of fact" defense, R. 318, Instruction No. 26).
Indeed, the trial court's instructions on mens rea included the four instructions on intent
and knowledge proposed by defendant (R. 273, 274, 275, 286; contra Def. Br. at 43).
Defendant's argument is therefore without merit.
This court reviews the trial court's jury instructions on elements of a crime
under a correctness standard. State v. Gibson. 908 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah App.) (citing
State v. Stevenson. 884 P.2d 1287, 1290 (Utah App. 1994), cert.denied. 892 P.2d 13
(Utah 1995)), cert.denied. 917 P.2d 556 (Utah 1996). However, jury instructions to
which a party failed to object at trial will not be reviewed absent a showing of manifest
injustice. LL (citing Utah R.Crim.P. 19(c); State v. Perdue. 813 P.2d 1201, 1203
(Utah App. 1991) aJId, 900 P.2d 1093 (Utah 1995)). Failure to give an elements
instruction for a crime satisfies the manifest injustice standard under Rule 19(c) and
constitutes reversible error as a matter of law. I$L (citing State v. Jones. 823 P.2d
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1059, 1061 (Utah 1991)). However, since the trial court instructed the jury on the
mens rea element, defendant's failure to object to the instructions has waived this issue.
See Stevenson. 884 P.2d at 1290.
The trial court's instructions on intent and knowledge were sufficient in any
event. In State v. Tebbs. 786 P.2d 775 (Utah App. 1990), this Court made clear that
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of either knowledge of the falsity of the
communication, or a reckless disregard for the truth is required for a conviction under
the communications fraud statute. Sfie. Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1801(7) (1990)
(amended in 1990 to include alternative of "intentionally").
The pertinent paragraphs of Instruction No. 10, given by the trial court, follow:
The essential elements of the crime of Communications Fraud . . .
are as follows:
1. That the defendant. . .
4. Having devised a scheme or artifice to defrand [sic] another or
to obtain from another amoney [sic], proeprty [sic], or anything of
value, [sic]
5. By means of false or fraudulent pretense, representations,
promises or material omissions,
6. Did communicate directly or indirectly with another by any
means for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice.

(R. 335; addendum E). This language essentially mirrors the statutory language
defining the offense. Sfi£ Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1801(1) (1990); see also. Utah Code
Ann. §76-2-102 (1983).
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This instruction requires that, to convict, the jury must find that defendant
"devised a scheme or artifice to defraud" and communicated false information "for the
purpose o r executing that scheme or artifice. On its face, this instruction satisfies the
requirement that defendant intentionally communicate false information, or have
knowledge of the falsity of the communication.
As this Court has noted, jury instructions are reviewed "in their entirety to
determine whether the instructions, taken as a whole, fairly instruct the jury on uie
applicable law." Law v. Blanding City. 893 P.2d 1083 (Utah App.), cert.denied. 910
P.2d 425 (Utah 1995). A conviction will be reversed on an instructional issue "only
where the party challenging the propriety of the instruction 'demonstrates prejudice
stemming from the instructions viewed in the aggregate.'" LL (quoting State v. Haston.
811 P.2d 929, 931 (Utah App. 1991), rev'd on other grounds. 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah
1993)). Taken in the aggregate, the communications fraud instruction and the other
instructions, given at defendant's trial without objection, were sufficient to instruct the
jury as to the mens rea required for a communications fraud conviction (see instructions
on: intent, R. 321-326, Instruction Nos. 18-23; the "honest belief" defense, R. 319,
Instruction No. 25; and the "mistake of fact" defense, R. 318, Instruction No. 26).
For example, the trial court gave the following instructions, proposed by
defendant:
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A person engages in conduct knowingly with respect to the conduct
or to circumstances surrounding the conduct when that person is aware of
the nature of the conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts
knowingly with respect to a result of the conduct when that person is
aware that the conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.
A person engages in conduct intentionally when it is that person's
conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.
. . . In every crime or public offense there must exist a union or joint
operation of act and intent. . . . You are instructed that:
(1) Unless otherwise provided, ignorance or mistake of fact which
disproves the culpable mental state is a defense to any prosecution for that
crime. . . .
(R. 321-22, 318; Instructions 22-23, 26). Therefore, in the context of the other jury
instructions, the trial court's mens rea instruction (that defendant, who had "devised a
scheme to defraud,'' must have communicated with another "for the purpose of"
executing his scheme to defraud) was sufficient.
Point 4
TRIAL DEFENSE COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THE
TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS DID NOT CONSTITUTE
DEFICIENT PERFORMANCE WHICH PREJUDICED
DEFENDANT BECAUSE THE INSTRUCTIONS WERE PROPER
Defendant argues that, if the instruction issue under Point 3 was not preserved,
it was deficient performance for his trial defense counsel not to raise it (Def. Br. at 4546). Defendants argument is moot and can be resolved in the issue of prejudice, since,
whether or not his counsel had raised it at trial, the issue would have been reviewable
under "manifest error." In any event, trial defense counsel's failure to object was not
deficient performance since the trial court's instructions were proper.
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The Supreme Court noted in Strickland v. Washington. 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2069
(1984), "If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of
sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed."
Accord, State V. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578 (Utah App.), cert.denied. 860 P.2d 943 (Utah
1993). It is so in this case. Even had defense counsel objected, it is not reasonably
likely that the outcome would have been different. Cartel, 776 P.2d at 893-94 n.30;
Strickland. 104 S.Ct. at 2069 (1984). Failure to give an elements instruction for a
crime satisfies the manifest injustice standard under Rule 19(c) and constitutes
reversible error as a matter of law, regardless of whether the issue was preserved for
appeal by an objection at trial. Gibson, 908 P.2d at 354. Had the trial court failed to
give an elements instruction, trial defense counsel's objection would have been
superfluous. Since the instruction was given, and the jury instructions were not in
error, there was no deficient performance and no prejudice.
CONCLUSION
The convictions and sentence should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this Q-KA day of May, 1997.
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Attorney General
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Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDA

Addendum A

Bob Stringham 1990 Distribution Chart
Jan.'90

Fcb.'90 Mar.'90 Apr.'90 May'90 Jim.'90

$600
A

$600

$600

$600

4

$600

4

$600
A

Jul.'90

$600

*

Aug.'90

I $600

!

A

Sep.'90 Oct.'90

$800
A

$800
A

Nov'90

Dec.'90

$800
A

$800

^ $912.75

$400

$400

JatL*90

Feb.'90 Mar.'90 Apr.'90 May'90 Jim.'90 Jul.*90
A

Carnagic W-2

$400

$400

$400

$400

$400

$400

$400

$400

Aug'90

Sep.'90 Oct.'90

$400

$400

Nov'90

Dec.'90

$13,712.75

Addendum B

Bob Stringham 1991 Distribution Chart
Jan.'91

Feb.*9l Mar.'91 Apr.'91 May'91 Jun.'91 Jul/91

$900
A

Aug.*91

Scp.'91 Oct/91

Nov'91

Dec.'9l

$1,925.50
A

$6,187.50
A

$1,787.50
A

\
$24,601.50

/
$400

v

v

J
Jan.'91

$400

$400

;

J

V

Feb.*91 Mar.'91 Apr.*91 May'91 Jun.'91 Jul.'91

Aug.'91

Sep.'91 Oct .'91

t
Camagie W-2
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Addendum C

Bob Stringham 1992 Distribution Chart
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Feb.*92 Mv.*92 Apr.'92 May'92 Jun/92 Jul'92

Aug'92

Sep.'92 Oct.'92

Nov'92

Dec.'92

Jan.*93 Feb.'93

|$2,175.00
A
fSl,925.0CJ
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Addendum D

Robert Stringham
92-045

Assign. Hrs.

Assigned
Hr.Payment

Gale's Hrs.

Gale's Payment

Total

Actual Payment

Unaccounted

Date

Bob's Salary

Bob's Fin.
Salary

91-08

$400.00

$700.00

16hrs.

$400.00

79.5 hrs.

$1,987.50

$3,487.50

$3,575.00

$87.50

91-09

$400.00

$700.00

14 hrs.

$350.00

102 hrs.

$2,550.00

$4,000.00

$4,800.00

$800.00

91-10

$400.00

$700.00

12 hrs.

$300.00

94 hrs.

$2,350.00

$3,750.00

$4,675.00

$925.00

91-11

$400.00

$700.00

10 hrs.

$250.00

98 hrs.

$2,450.00

$3,800.00

$4,700.00

$900.00

91-12

$400.00

$700.00

5 hrs.

$125.00

73 hrs.

$1,825.00

$3,050.00

$4,012.50

$962.50

92-01

$400.00

$700.00

6 hrs.

$150.00

97.5 hrs.

$2,437.50

$3,687.50

$4,812.50

$1,125.00

92-02

$400.00

$700.00

3 hrs.

$75.00

97 hrs.

$2,425.00

$3,600.00

$4,750.00

$1,150.00

92-03

$400.00

$700.00

5 hrs.

$125.00

107 hrs.

$2,675.00

$3,900.00

$5,250.00

$1,350.00

92-04

$400.00

$700.00

7 hrs.

$175.00

120 hrs.

$3,000.00

$4,275.00

$5,562.50

$1,287.50

92-05

$400.00

$700.00

4 hrs.

$100.00

88 hrs.

$2,200.00

$3,400.00

$4,775.00

$1,375.00

92-06

$400.00

$700.00

13 hrs.

$325.00

73.5 hrs.

$1,837.50

$3,262.50

$4,562.50

$1,300.00

92-07

$400.00

$700.00

6 hrs.

$150.00

75 hrs.

$1,875.00

$3,125.00

$4,250.00

$1,125.00

Total

$4,800.00

$8,400.00

101 hrs.

$2,525.00

1104.5 hrs.

$27,612.50

$43,337.50

$55,725.00

$12,387.50
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Bob & Gail Stringham Distribution Chart
Aug.91 Scpt91 Oct91
PAYMENT DUX

$l9t7J0

$2350.00

793

102

ACT. HR8.WORKED
TOTAL

$2350*00
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$1425 00

73
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<S13$730)| <$MS0J0)
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|($l,7f730) |(S1,97&40)

Mar. 92

Apr. 92
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$3,000.00
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May 92 June 92 July 92 Aug.92
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$27*123040
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|<$24<X5i)

($237440)
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[($137340)

02331230)
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$ $0040

$92540

$900.00

$90230

$1,125.00

$1,150.00

$1350.00

$137.50

$1375.00

S134O.0*

$1325.00

($12307.50)

ASSIGNED HRS.

$40040

J 35000

$30040

$250.00

$ 12500

$ 150.00

S

75.00

$ 125.00

$ 175.00

$ 100.00

|| 325.00

$ 150.00

($ 2325.00)

ASSIGNED SALARY

$700.00

$700.00

$700.00

$700.00

$ 700.00

$ 700.00

|$ 700.00

$ 700.00

$700.00

$700.00

$700.00

$700.00

($$,40040)

ASSIGNED HRS. * CASH

16/$400

14/ $350

12/$300

10/ $250

05/$75

06/$150

03/$75

05/$125

07/$175

$700

$700

$700

$700

$700

$700

$700

$700

I

I

I

I

I

I

I
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$400

$400

$400

$400

$400

$400

$1,100

$1,100

$1300

UNACCOUNTED

ASSIGNED SALARY

REPORTED SALARY

I

$700

$700

I
$400
$1,100

$1,100

ACTUAL SALARY
$1,100

$1,100

$1,100

Aug.91 Sept91 Oct91

$700

13/$325

$1,100

$1,100

Nov.91 Dec.91 Jan.92

04/$100

$700

$1,100
$1,100

Feb.92

06/$150

Mar. 92

Apr. 92

May 92 June 92 July 92 Aug.92

Addendum £

INSTRUCTION NO.

The essential elements of the crime of Communication
Fraud, a Second Degree Felony, as charged Counts 2, 3 and 4 of the
Information, are as follows:
1.
2.

That the defendant, Robert Stringham,
On or about January 29, 1991, May 6, 1992, and

February 6, 1993,
34.

In Utah County, Utah,
Having devised a scheme or artifice to defrand

another or to obtain from another amoney, proeprty, or anything of
value.
5.

By

means

of

false

or

fraudulent

pretense,

representations, promises or material omission,
6.

Did communicate directly or indirectly with another

by any means for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme
or artifice,
7.

And that the property, money, or thing obtained or

sought to be obtained has a value of more than $10,000 but does not
exceed $100,000.
If the State has failed to prove to your satisfaction
beyond a reasonable doubt any one or more of the essential elements
of the crime charged in Counts 2, 3, and 4, you must acquit the

